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THE CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARDS
ACT OF 1976
The American rule of attorneys' fees provides that each party to
litigation pays his own attorney in the absence of statutory or con-
tractual provisions to the contrary.' Courts, however, have authority
to shift the burden of fees to a particular party under equitable excep-
tions to the American rule.2 Fees will be shifted when a party acts in
bad faith,3 or when a fee award will spread the costs of counsel among
those who benefit substantially from the lawsuit.' A third exception
to the rule, the private attorney general rationale, permitted courts
to award fees to a prevailing plaintiff when the suit had furthered a
congressional policy envisioning private enforcement of federal law.5
These exceptions to the American rule are derived from the inherent
equitable powers of the courts in the absence of statutory direction.6
This lack of statutory authority proved fatal to the private attorney
general concept in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society.7 In Alyeska the Supreme Court held that Congress alone was
responsible for determining when private prosecution of specific stat-
utes furthered public policy;8 therefore, fees would not be awarded
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973); see text accompanying notes 18-22 infra.
2 Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); see text accompanying notes 26-33
infra.
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); see text accompanying notes 36-45 infra.
See Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); La Raza
Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Calif. 1972), af'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973);
text accompanying notes 46-59 infra. The private attorney general doctrine provided
a vehicle by which courts were able to ease the financial burden placed upon plaintiffs
bringing environmental and civil rights suits for injunctive relief. See generally Award-
ing Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General"; Judicial Green Light to Private
Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733 (1973).
1 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S.
161, 166 (1939).
1 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Plaintiff Wilderness Society brought suit to enjoin the
Secretary of the Interior from issuing permits authorizing construction of the Alaska
pipeline. The Society alleged that the plans submitted failed to comply with the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 87 Stat. 576 (1920) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 185,
(Supp. V 1975)), and that the Secretary had failed to comply with the requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
Alyeska, a consortium of oil companies constructing the project, intervened. Fees were
awarded against Alyeska by the court of appeals on the private attorney general theory,
495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
9 421 U.S. at 262. See Cedar, Defrosting the Alyeska Chill: The Future of Attor-
neys' Fees Awards in Environmental Litigation, 5 ENVT'L ArF. 297 (1976).
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under the private attorney general theory to a prevailing plaintiff
without congressional authority.
Congress responded to the Alyeska decision with the Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976.1 The Act amends 42 U.S.C. §
1988 and provides federal courts with discretionary authority to
award attorneys' fees to prevailing parties in private lawsuits when
enforcing the Reconstruction-era civil rights acts, 0 Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972.12 Although Congress has provided for similar attorneys' fees
awards in most civil rights legislation since 1964,' 3 the laws covered
by the Attorneys' Fees Act have no such integrated provisions. Plain-
tiffs bringing suit under § 1983,1 for example, could not recover coun-
sel fees unless their suit fell within a traditional equitable exception
to the no-fee rule. Moreover, the circumstances under which these
civil rights plaintiffs could recover attorneys' fees were severely re-
stricted by the demise of the private attorney general exception. As
a result, Congress feared that the high cost of civil rights litigation
would discourage potential plaintiffs from bringing suit in the ab-
sence of a reasonable prospect of recovering attorneys' fees.'5 Further-
more, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that the civil rights
statutes would not be enforced, and civil liberties would not be pro-
tected, without private plaintiffs.'" Thus, the 1976 Attorneys' Fees
Act is a direct congressional response to Alyeska's inhibiting influ-
ence upon civil rights litigation.'7
I Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1988). The Senate
Judiciary Committee declared that the purpose the bill was to "remedy anomalous
gaps in our civil rights laws created by the United States Supreme Court's recent
decision in Alyeska. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as S. REP.].
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985, 1986 (1970).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. (1970).
12 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (Supp. IV 1974).
,1 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)(1970); Emer-
gency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. V 1975); Equal Employment
Admendments of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d)(Supp. V 1975); Voting Rights Act
Extension of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (Supp. V 1975).
' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
5 S. REP. supra note 9, at 1. The Senate Report stated that "[i]f the cost of
private enforcement becomes too great, there will be no private enforcement." Id. at
6.
" Id. at 6. The Judiciary Committee predicted that fee awards to prevailing plain-
tiffs would insure that the civil rights statutes would not become "mere hollow pro-
nouncements which the average citizen cannot enforce." Id.
Id. at 1. The Act does not reverse Alyeska directly, since the Act does not
provide for fees in the environmental statutes sued upon in Alyeska. See note 7 supra.
The Act deals only with Alyeska's effect upon civil rights litigation.
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The Alyeska decision reaffiarmed the vitality of the basic Ameri-
can rule that each litigant must pay his own attorney in the absence
of statutory or contractual provisions to the contrary."8 The principal
justification for the rule is that a strict policy of shifting fees to the
losing party would discourage impecunious plaintiffs due to fear of
failure and the resulting burden of satisfying the defendant's attor-
neys' fees." Nevertheless, the American rule has been criticized as an
unwarranted impediment to indigent plaintiffs, since deduction of
fees from damage recoveries will not make a prevailing plaintiff
whole."0 The principle is particularly harsh in denying fee awards to
successful plaintiffs in civil rights actions which will not result in the
payment of damages."' The American rule, however, is not absolute;
Congress has created statutory exceptions,22 while federal courts have
exercised their inherent equitable powers to develop additional ex-
ceptions.?
Federal courts have recognized two general categories of equitable
exceptions to the American rule: the common benefit and bad faith
14 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Hall
v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). The
American rule differs from the general practice in other nations, including Great Brit-
ain, of awarding fees to the prevailing party. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 n.4 (1973);
Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 636, 639 (1974). American deviation from the British approach has been attrib-
uted to American distrust of lawyers, id. at 641, and to the failure of statutory fee
scales to keep pace with inflation, Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and
the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 792 (1966).
"1 F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co. 417 U.S. 116, 126 (1974); Mause, Winner
Takes All: A Re-examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. REv. 26 (1969). In
F.D. Rich the Court suggested that an idemnification procedure would burden the
judiciary with hearings to determine a reasonable fee award figure. 417 U.S. at 126.
The Court also feared the threat to an independent bar posed by placing the judiciary
in control of attorneys' incomes. Id.
"' See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CALIF. L. REv. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why NotA Cost of Litigation?,
49 IOWA L. Rav. 75 (1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation
as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619 (1931); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees
Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. Rv. 202 (1966).
21 See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968)(per curiam);
Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Note, Allowance of
Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Actions, 7 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROB. 381 (1971).
2 See note 13 supra. See also H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14
(1976) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.], which lists fifty-four statutes providing for
fee awards. (H.R. 15460, which was superseded by the Senate version of the Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, was a companion to the Senate bill.)
23 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975);
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
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doctrines. Gradual expansion of these doctrines led to development
of a third exception, the private attorney general theory. 24 The Su-
preme Court repudiated the private attorney general theory in
Alyeska, but explicitly affirmed the viability of the common benefit
and bad faith rationales.2
The bad faith exception to the American rule of attorneys' fees
allows a court to shift fees to any party found to have institihted an
action or asserted a defense in "bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or
for oppressive reasons. "26 If the court determines that a suit is frivo-
lous or brought solely for purposes of harrassment, the plaintiff may
be required to pay the defendant's attorneys' feesY If either party to
an action utilizes intentionally dilatory tactics, the court may trans-
fer fees to the culpable party.2 Although this discretionary power is
exercised in a highly subjective and frequently inconsistent manner,2 9
21 See text accompanying notes 33-35 and 46-59 infra.
421 U.S. at 257-59.
26 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77, at 1709 (2d ed. 1976); accord, Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975); F. D. Rich Co. v.
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
2 See, e.g., Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976); United States
Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975); Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corp.,
6 F.Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934). Carrion and United States Steel both involved statutes
authorizing fee awards to prevailing parties within the court's discretion. Although
statutorily authorized, the applicable standards for the exercise of a court's discretion
are the same as those used in awarding fees under an equitable exception to the
American rule. See text accompanying notes 94-98 infra.
21 See, e.g., Bond v. Stanton, 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.), vacated, 45 U.S.L.W. 3394
(U.S. Nov. 30, 1976), where the court found that defendant's bad faith conduct had
prolonged unnecessarily the litigation. Plaintiff had filed suit to compel Indiana to
comply with Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396i (1970). An
amendment to that Act required all states receiving federal funds under the Act to
develop a health screening program by February, 1972, for children eligible for Medi-
caid benefits. 42 U.S.C.§ 1396d(a) (4) (B)(1970). The State failed to meet the deadline,
and plaintiff's subsequent action obtained an injunction ordering compliance by July,
1974. The court of appeals found that once the lawsuit had begun, defendants "contin-
ually asserted compliance with HEW requirements in the face of documentation to the
contrary." 528 F.2d at 690.
In Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976), a
suit to obtain relief against a city operated obstetrics-gynecology clinic which refused
to administer abortions, the city asserted that since the plaintiff was no longer preg-
nant, she had lost standing to sue. The court found the defense completely frivolous
in view of the Supreme Court's rejection of the same argument in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973). The Eighth Circuit awarded fees to the plaintiff.
22 Falcon, Award of Attorneys'Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutonal Litigation,
33 MD. L. REv. 379 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights
Litigation].
ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARDS ACT
the capability allows the judiciary to maintain a docket free of un-
founded and unnecessarily time consuming litigation. 0 Thus, the bad
faith fee award will punish wrongful intentions and deter future con-
duct of a similar nature.
3
1
Courts supplemented these motives of judicial efficiency and pun-
ishment of wrongdoers by utilizing the bad faith doctrine to encour-
age prompt compliance with the law. This result was achieved by
expanding the concept of bad faith to encompass cases necessitated
by the defendant's "obdurate obstinacy" in the evasion of a clear
legal duty.32 The expanded use of the bad faith doctrine coincided
with federal judicial enforcement of desegregation policy in the 1960s,
when some school boards resisted integration by refusing to comply
with the law.3 The courts recognized the injustice of requiring vic-
tims of such civil rights violations to pay attorneys to protect those
rights.34 The increased willingness of courts to award fees in civil
Compare Cato v. Parham, 293 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 403 F.2d 12 (8th
Cir. 1968), with Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d
318 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated 416 U.S. 696 (1974). Both Cato and Bradley were school
desegregation cases. In Cato the district court awarded fees under an obdurate obstin-
acy theory, even though the court did not question the school board's good faith. The
court found that despite the school board's good intentions, "whatever progress has
been made has followed judicial prodding." 293 F. Supp. at 1378. The court of appeals
affirmed the award with little discussion, saying only that the award was within the
trial judge's discretion. 403'F.2d at 16.
In Bradley, the district court also awarded fees to the plaintiff. The court found
that "given the choice between desegregating the schools and committing a contempt
of court, they would choose the first, but. . . in any event desegregation would only
come about by court order." 53 F.R.D. at 39. The court of appeals reversed, terming
the fee award "unfair" since the law in the area was unclear. 472 F.2d at 327.
3' See Note, Attorneys'Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1875,
1892 (1975).
31 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
12 See Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.) vacated 382 U.S. 103 (1965);
Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963). In Bradley the court noted that fees
were to be awarded only in exceptional cases. "Attorneys' fees are appropriate only
when it is found that the bringing of the action should have been unnecessary and was
compelled by the school board's unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy." 345 F.2d at 321.
31 Note, Attorneys' Fees- "Bad Faith" Exception-Attorneys' Fees Allowed
Under Bad Faith Exception After Alyeska Decision Narrowed "Private Attorney Gen-
eral" Doctrine: Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1975), 8 CONN. L. REv. 551 (1976);
Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green
Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 735 (1973).
3, See, e.g., Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966). The court
reluctantly affirmed a fee award of only $250. The plaintiff had appealed the low
amount of the award, but the circuit court found that the trial judge had not abused
his discretion. The court of appeals noted that although the matter of fee awards could
19771
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rights cases conditioned the judiciary to accept a fee shifting ration-
ale based principally upon social policy considerations.5
While the bad faith fee award transfers fees to a culpable party,
the goal of the common benefit approach is an equitable distribution
of attorneys' fees among the beneficiaries of the lawsuit. 6 The com-
mon benefit doctrine provides that fees may be awarded to a success-
ful plaintiff where the action has conferred a substantial benefit upon
members of an ascertainable class, 37 and where the fee award will
spread the costs of counsel among members of the beneficiary class.8
Originally, application of the common benefit doctrine was lim-
ited to suits which had resulted in judgments of damages or recovery
of monetary funds from which fees could be paid. 9 In Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co.,4" however, the Supreme Court held that the benefit
recovered need not be pecuniary in nature for application of the com-
mon benefit concept." Mills was a shareholder suit in which the
be reviewed only for abuse of discretion, "[t]he time is coming to an end when
recalcitrant state officials can force unwilling victims of illegal discrimination to bear
the constant and crushing expense of enforcing their constitutionally accorded rights."
Id. at 671.
1 King & Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental
Litigation, 41 TENN. L. REV. 27, 29 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Right to Counsel Fees].
1, Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights Litigation, supra note 29, at 402; Right to Coun-
sel Fees, supra note 35, at 43.
11 The common benefit doctrine is especially useful in class actions certified under
FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator and
Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973); Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 481 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1092 (1973); 3b MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTIcE 23.91 (2d ed. 1976).
11 The common benefit doctrine should not be applied in cases in which the
beneficiary class must be defined as the public at large, since determining which
persons actually had benefited from the action would be impossible. See text accompa-
nying note 44 infra.
11 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-6 n.7 (1973). See also Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank,
307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trustees v. Greennough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882); Dawson, Lawyers
and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1597 (1974).
40 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
' Id. at 392. The Court stated that
[tihe fact that this suit has not yet produced, and may never pro-
duce, a monetary recovery from which the fees could be paid does not
preclude an award based on this rationale. Although the earliest cases
recognizing a right to reimbursement involved litigation that had pro-
duced or preserved a "common fund" for the benefit of a group, noth-
ing in these cases indicates that the suit must actually bring money
into the court as a prerequisite to the court's power to order reimburse-
ment of expenses.
ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARDS ACT
plaintiff challenged the corporation's use of misleading proxy state-
ments." The Court held that the plaintiffs initiative in compelling
company compliance with federal statutory requirements had bene-
fited the other shareholders by protecting their statutory right to an
informed corporate election.13 The beneficiary class in Mills was lim-
ited in number and the Court reasonably could determine that each
member had benefited from the suit." In a civil rights suit, however,
such a determination is not possible. The beneficiaries of civil rights
suits often are members of large segments of the public. Thus, courts
would be unable to assess accurately the impact of fees upon individ-
ual members of those groups . 5 Nevertheless, the Mills emphasis on
the value of private enforcement of statutory rights formed the basis
for the private attorney general doctrine.
The private attorney general doctrine operates to encourage pri-
vate enforcement of federal statutes by awarding attorneys' fees to
plaintiffs who prevail in lawsuits under those statutes." The doctrine
developed through interpretation of explicit attorneys' fees provisions
in civil rights statutes enacted since 1964,11 which give the trial judge
discretion to award attorneys' fees to prevailing parties. 8 The Su-
preme Court considered such a provision of Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,11 in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.-" Newman
held that the discretion of the trial judge to award fees under Title II
is guided by congressional intent to encourage private enforcement of
11 Id. at 377-78. The complaint alleged that the proxy statement violated § 14(a)
of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1970).
13 See text accompanying note 53 infra.
11 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 265 n.39 (1975).
0 Id.; Lytle v. Commissioners of Election, 541 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1976); Satoskar
v. Real Estate Comm'n, 517 F.2d 696 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975); La
Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Calif. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir.
1973); Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd on other grounds,
345 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
11 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam); Lee
v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1972); La Raza Unida v. Volpe;
57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Calif. 1972), afl'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973).
" See generally Right to Counsel Fees, supra note 35; Note, Awarding Attorneys'
Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in
the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 733 (1973).
"1 See, e.g., Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. IV 1974);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title H, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b)(1970); Civil Rights Act of
1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)(1970); Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title VIII, 42
U.S.C. § 3612(c)(1970).
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b)(1970).
390 U.S. 400 (1968).
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the Act." In order to foster suits under Title H pertaining to racial
discrmination in public accommodations by private attorneys gen-
eral, the Court stated that fee awards should not be limited to bad
faith situations.12 The Court ruled that plaintiffs prevailing in suits
under Title II should recover fees in all but exceptional circumstan-
ces.1
3
The principles enumerated in Newman, synthesized with the lan-
guage of Mills, provided a basis for expansion of the private attorney
general concept into situations in which fee awards were not statuto-
rily authorized. 5' In Mills, the Court concluded that the shareholders
of the defendant company had benefited substantially from plain-
tiff's initiative in compelling corporate compliance with federal se-
curities laws. 5 Newman also emphasized the importance of private
action to enforce federal laws. 8 Although Mills did not involve an
attorneys' fee statute, both Newman and Mills promoted identical
policy considerations. Some courts used this similarity to apply the
liberal discretionary standards of Newman to award fees where appl-
icable statutes failed to provide for attorneys' fees. 7 These courts
awarded fees to plaintiffs prevailing in civil rights and environmental
lawsuits in which the trial judge found that private action was an
important part of the statutory enforcement scheme. 8 Thus, the pri-
5' 390 U.S. at 402. The Court explained:
If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attor-
neys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the
public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts.
Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees ... to en-
courage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial
relief under Title II.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
5 Id. See Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights Litigation, supra note 29, at 396.
390 U.S. at 402. The Court held that in suits under Title II, "one who succeeds
in obtaining an injunction under that Title should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee
unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Id.
I See, e.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Calif. 1972), aff'd, 488
F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973).
- 396 U.S. at 396. The Court concluded that "the stress placed by Congress on
the importance of fair and informed corporate suffrage leads to the conclusion that, in
vindicating the statutory policy, petitioners have rendered a substantial service to the
corporation and its shareholders." Id.
" See text accompanying note 51 supra.
" See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); La
Raze Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Calif. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir.
1973); cases collected in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
270 n.46 (1975).
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vate attorney general concept of Newman developed into a third
equitable exception to the American rule of attorneys fees.59
The Supreme Court seized upon the lack of statutory authoriza-
tion in Alyeska to quash the private attorney general doctrine and
reaffirm the American rule. The Court followed the rule established
in the 1796 case of Arcambel v. Wiseman" that federal courts would
not award attorneys' fees as a part of costs until Congress authorized
the practice.' The Alyeska Court enforced the American rule since
it could find no congressional repudiation of the no-fee rule; federal
attorneys' fees statutes were merely congressionally created excep-
tions to the general rule.' The Court, despite endorsing the bad faith
and common benefit doctrines as legitimate equitable alternatives,"'
ruled that the exercise of judicial equitable powers would not support
a fee award intended to facilitate private protection of federal rights."
Thus, Alyeska requires Congress to select those statutes which should
include attorneys' fees provisions designed to encourage private liti-
gation and enforcement.'- Congress responded to the Court's sugges-
- See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Calif. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d
559 (9th Cir. 1973).
" The court of appeals in Alyeska awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff even
though the court found the bad faith and common benefit doctrines inapplicable, and
no statute authorized the award. Wilderness Soc'y- v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C.
Cir.), rev'd sub nom Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975).
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
11 The Court refused to sustain inclusion of $1600 in attorneys' fees as an element
of damages. "The general practice of the United States is in opposition to it; and even
if that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the
court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute." Id.
62 421 U.S. at 260. The Court stated that "[wihat Congress has done, however,
while fully recognizing and accepting the general rule, is to make specific and explicit
provisions for the allowance of attorneys' fees under selected statutes granting or
protecting various federal rights." Id. (footnote omitted).
" Id. at 258-59.
" Id. at 260.
Id. at 263-64. The Court reasoned that the judiciary is ill suited to make the
policy judgments required to apply the private attorney general doctrine:
Congress itself presumably has the power and judgment to pick and
choose among its statutes and to allow attorneys' fees under some, but
not others. But it would be difficult, indeed, for the courts, without
legislative guidance, to consider some statutes important and others
unimportant and to allow attorneys' fees only in connection with the
former.
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tion with the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976.66
Congress intended the Act to promote private litigation 7 under
the Reconstruction-era civil rights acts,68 Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,69 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.1'
The Act provides that in any action under those statutes "the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. ' 71 The lan-
guage of the Act leaves much to the discretion of the trial judge. A
court first must determine whether an award of fees to the prevailing
party would be consistent with the policies of the Act.12 The trial
" Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
S. REP., supra note 9, at 2. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee
explained that "[a]ll of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforce-
ment, and fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have
a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which
these laws contain." Id.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) (equal rights of citizens); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)
(property rights of citizens); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (civil action for deprivation of
rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970) (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights); 42 U.S.C. §
1986 (1970) (action for neglecting to prevent conspiracy to interfere with civil rights).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. (1970) (prohibition against exclusion from participa-
tion in, denial of benefits of, and discrimination under federally assisted programs on
grounds of race, color, or national origin).
70 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (Supp. V 1975) (prohibition against exclusion from
participation in, denial of benefits of, and discrmination under federally assisted edu-
cation program on grounds of sex or blindness).
No private causes of action have arisen under Title IX. Suits under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, however, may be sufficient to enforce provisions of the statute against most
federally assisted school systems. See, e.g., Berkelman v. United School Dist., 501 F.2d
1264 (9th'Cir. 1974); Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1973); Trent v. Perritt, 391 F. Supp. 171 (S.D. Miss. 1975). Representative Railsback,
one of the floor leaders of the bill in the House, indicated that the Act was not designed
to create a private cause of action under Title IX. Rather, Railsback said that the
purpose of the Title IX fee provision was to provide fees if the courts ever should allow
private causes of action under Title IX. 122 CONG. REC. 12153 (daily ed., October 1,
1976).
The language and structure of Title VI and Title IX are almost identical. The only
major difference between the two statutes is that while Title IX denies federal funds
to educational institutions that discriminate on the basis of sex and blindness, Title
VI denies funds to programs which discriminate on the basis of race. In Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563 (1974), the Court sustained a cause of action under Title VI for ethnic
segregation in education. The complaint had charged violations of Title VI as well as
the equal protection clause. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the equal protec-
tion issues and decided the case solely on the basis of Title VI. Id. at 566. Since the
courts have allowed causes of action based solely upon the provisions of Title VI, a
private cause of action under Title IX would seem equally justified.
71 Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
72 See text accompanying notes 76-98 infra.
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judge also must decide whether the party seeking fees has "pre-
vailed" within the meaning of the statute.7 3 Finally, the court must
exercise its discretion to determine a fee that is "reasonable" in
amount.7' In each instance, Congress intended that the trial court's
discretion be guided by existing judicial interpretations of similar fee
provisions in civil rights statutes.
75
Cases interpreting similar attorneys' fees statutes have estab-
lished the standards to be used in determining the propriety of fee
awards to prevailing parties. The Supreme Court in Newman deter-
mined that fee provisions in civil rights statutes are designed to facili-
tate private enforcement of those rights. Thus, the courts should be
concerned primarily with assuring potential plaintiffs that they will
not be burdened with attorneys' fees. 77 Liberal shifting of fees in favor
of prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights actions will encourage private
litigation and promote the enforcement objectives of the civil rights
statutes.8 Fee awards to prevailing defendants, however, will not
encourage potential plaintiffs to bring suits under those statutes, and
such awards rarely should be permitted. 7 Awards to prevailing plain-
tiffs merit different considerations than those involved in awards to
prevailing defendants. Therefore, two different judicial standards
have developed for application in awarding fees.
The Supreme Court announced the standard to be applied to
prevailing plaintiffs in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 1 The
Court ruled that under the terms and policy objectives of the Title II
fee award provision,8 prevailing plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover
an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an
" See text accompanying notes 99-106 infra.
7' See text accompanying notes 107-113 infra.
7 S. REP., supra note 9, at 6.
7' Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968) (per curiam).
Id.; see also Note, Allowance of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Actions, 7 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 381 (1971); Note, Civil Rights-Attorneys'Fees-A Plaintiff Should
Ordinarily Recover Attorneys' Fees Under Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Public
Accommodations Section), 4 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223 (1968).
79 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
1' S. REP., supra note 9, at 5; Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement
Procedures and Relief and Remedies, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 495, 506 (1966);
Comment, Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964: Standards for Award of Attorneys' Fees
to Prevailing Defendants, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 207.
" 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
" 42 U.S.C. 2000a-3(b) (1970), pertaining to attorneys' fees, provides in part:
In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee ....
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award unjust. ' 82 The Court justified this liberal standard by noting
that congressional intent to encourage civil rights would be frustrated
by awarding fees only under the more restrictive bad faith standard.8
Moreover, the Court determined that fees should be ordinarily
recoverable in Title II suits since the statute does not allow recovery
of damages from which fees could be paid."4 Therefore, the Court
established a standard that awards fees to plaintiffs prevailing in
virtually every case under Title ]I.
The Court indicated that this standard is applicable to other civil
rights statutes in Northcross v. Board of Education.85 Northcross in-
volved a suit to enjoin school segregation under the Emergency
School Aid Act of 1972.86 That Act provides for attorneys' fees in
language similar to the Title II provision." The Northcross Court
determined that the statutory similarity justified the presumption
that both statutes should be construed alike. This presumption was
reinforced by the common purpose shared by the statutes to effect
compliance with federal civil rights statutes.8
The Newman-Northcross standard should apply with equal justi-
fication to plaintiffs prevailing in suits under the civil rights statutes
covered by the 1976 Attorneys' Fees Act.88 The language of the Act is
virtually identical to the language interpreted in both Newman and
Northcross.11 Moreover, the declared purpose of the Act is to encour-
390 U.S. at 402.
% Id.
M Id.
- 412 U.S. 427 (1973)(per curiam).
20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. V 1975).
20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. V 1975) provides:
Upon the entry of a final order by a court [for racial discrimination
in education], the court, in its discretion, upon a finding that the
proceedings were necessary to bring about compliance, may allow the
prevailing party other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs.
See also note 81 supra.
' 412 U.S. at 428; Johnson v. Combs, 471 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
413 U.S. 922 (1973).
"' The Newman-Northcross standard also has been applied to other civil rights
attorneys' fees provisions. In Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th
Cir. 1970), the court used the Newman-Northcross standard to award fees under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)(1970), the attorneys' fees provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. The wording of that statute is virtually identical to the fee provision
interpreted in Newman. See note 81 supra. The same standard also has been applied
to the fee provision of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612
(1970)(Fair Housing). Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1974);
contra, Fort v. White, 520 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1976). See note 92 infra.
"1 Compare text at note 71 supra with notes 81 and 87 supra.
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age private enforcement of civil rights. The fact that damages are
available under some of the statutes covered by the Act should not
preclude an award of attorneys' fees." Damages will not make the
plaintiff whole if he subsequently must deduct attorneys' fees from
the recovery." Moreover, in suits against public officials under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, damage recoveries often are limited or prohibited
entirely by the common law immunities available to public defen-
dants.13 Despite the theoretical availability of damages, private civil
rights litigants under the statutes will be burdened by attorneys' fees.
Application of the near mandatory standard of Newman-Northcross
to the Act should alleviate that burden, and help realize congres-
sional intent to promote civil rights litigation.
Congressional policy of encouraging litigation by private plain-
tiffs, however, will not support a discretionary standard that results
in regular fee awards to prevailing defendants. 4 Plaintiffs who bring
" H.R. Rep., supra note 22, at 8-9.
12 The American no-fee rule penalizes plaintiffs in tort suits as well as civil rights
actions. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CALIF. L. REv. 792 (1966). Tort recoveries, however, provide a fund from which fees can
be paid, whereas many civil rights actions result only in injunctive relief.
Compare Fort v. White, 530 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1976) with Jeanty v. McKey &
Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1974). The Second Circuit in Fort declined to
apply the Newman-Northcross standard to Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)(1970), which provides for fair housing. The Second Circuit noted
that one reason for application of a near mandatory standard in Newman and
Northcross was that those statutes did not allow damage recoveries. Title VIII, how-
ever, provides for both compensatory and punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)(1970).
Since the Title VIII fee provision expressly conditions fee awards upon the financial
inability of the plaintiff to bear the fees himself, the court determined that Congress
intended to limit fee awards under the statute. In Jeanty, however, the Seventh Circuit
applied the Newman-Northcross standard to Title VIII to encourage private enforce-
ment of the statute. The court also remanded the case for a reconsideration of the trial
court's refusal to award punitive damages. 496 F.2d at 1121-22.
Congress, however, clearly intended that successful civil rights plaintiffs recover
fees regardless of any damages recovered. H.R. REP., supra note 22, at 9. The House
committee said that civil rights plaintiffs should be afforded the same conconsidera-
tion given antitrust plaintiffs, who always recover fees in addition to treble damages.
Id.
, H.R. REP., supra note 22, at 8-9. In suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, damages are
not recoverable from state officials acting in their official capacities. Edelman v. Jor-
dan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). In addition, state officials sued in their personal capacities
are protected by a qualified discretionary immunity. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975).
" Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976); Wright v. Stone Container
Corp., 524 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1975); United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519
F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.
La. 1971); S. REP., supra note 9, at 5; Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement
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complaints based on unsettled legal principles will be less likely to
bring suit if they will be forced to pay their opponent's counsel fees
upon failure of their "test case."" Therefore, in order to facilitate
litigation, courts will award attorneys' fees to prevailing defendants
only in those instances in which the plaintiff has shown bad faith.
This approach deters plaintiffs who would bring lawsuits that are
clearly unfounded or litigated merely for purposes of harrassment and
embarrassment. 7 Thus, fee awards to prevailing defendants will be
limited to exceptional cases to promote congressional intent to afford
civil rights plaintiffs every opportunity to protect their rights. 8
The trial judge must also exercise his discretion under the Act
to determine the state of the proceedings at which fees should be
awarded. The Act provides for fee awards to the "prevailing" party
without specifying the degree of finality required before fees may be
granted.9 Postponement of fee awards until final resolution of all
issues in court could place a heavy economic burden upon plaintiffs
involved in protracted litigation and frustrate the purposes of the
Act.' 0 The Supreme Court noted in Bradley v. School Board'' that
courts should use a pragmatic approach to the problem of finality,
awarding fees incident to the "entry of any order that determines
Procedures and Relief and Remedies, 7 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 495, 506 (1966);
Comment, Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964: Standards for Award of Attorney's Fees
to Prevailing Defendants, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 207.
95 Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-examination of the Idemnity System, 55 IOWA
L. Rav. 26, 41 (1969).
" See, e.g., Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976). Plaintiff brought
an unsuccessful employment discrimination suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1970). The plaintiff lost an earlier state action based on the same acts complained of
in this suit. The federal district court found that the plaintiff perjured herself and
attempted to obtain false testimony from two of her employees, 535 F.2d at 728. The
court of appeals affirmed the lower court, finding that the suit "was motivated by
malice and vindictiveness and that it was without merit." Id. at 728. The defendant
university recovered $5000 in attorneys' fees.
9 See note 92 supra.
The Report of the House Judiciary Committee noted that much of the litigation
covered by the Act would proceed against governmental bodies or officials. These
defendants have resources, including the plaintiff's tax dollars, superior to those of
civil rights plaintiffs. The Committee reported that awarding fees to public defendants
in these suits "would further widen the gap between citizens and government offi-
cials." H.R. REP., supra note 22, at 7. In addition, awarding fees to plaintiffs who
prevail over state defendants is not barred by eleventh amendment principals of state
sovereign immunity. Id.; see text accompanying notes 114-128 infra.
" Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1988). See text
accompanying note 71 supra.
"0 H.R. REP., supra note 22, at 8.
101 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
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substantial rights of the parties."'' 0 2 A court should have the discre-
tion to award fees to a party who prevails on any significant matter
that reasonably can be treated as a distinct element in the course of
the litigation,10 regardless of the final outcome of the lawsuit.',4 In
addition, prevailing plaintiffs should recover fees even though they
have not prevailed in court on the merits of the case, but have ob-
tained a consent decree'05 or informal relief.0 6
' Id. at 722 n.28.
" Bradley involved a fee award in a school desegregation case. The fee provision
of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. V 1975), stipulates
that fees are to be awarded to prevailing plaintiffs "upon the entry of a final order."
See note 87 supra. In order to award fees under the statute, therefore, a court must
determine whether its order is "final" and whether the plaintiff has "prevailed."
In Bradley, the Court noted that in a school desegregation case many final orders
will issue during the years in which the desegregation plan is in effect. "To delay a fee
award until the entire litigation is concluded would work substantial hardship on
plaintiffs and their counsel, and discourage the institution of actions despite the clear
congressional intent to the contrary. . . ." 416 U.S. at 723. As a result, the Court
awarded fees despite its acknowledgement that the litigation was not yet complete.
Neither party in Bradley contested the finality of the court order within the
meaning of the statute; therefore, the Court did not discuss extensively the stages of
litigation at which fees could be awarded. The Court did note, however, that "the entry
of any order that determines substantial rights of the parties may be an appropriate
occasion upon which to consider the propriety of an award of counsel fees. . . Id. at
723 n.8. In Johnson v. Combs, 471 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922
(1973), the Fifth Circuit defined finality under the statute in terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1970). That statute limits circuit court jurisdiction to final decisions of the district
courts.
Since the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act does not require entry of a final
order before fees can be awarded, a party need only "prevail" in order to recover fees.
Thus, an award of fees under the Act would be appropriate when a party has prevailed
upon a significant matter, even though the matter may not be appealable under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. In Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974), the
court awarded fees to Xerox incidental to an interlocutory appeal. The suit involved
employment discrimination under Title VII. The EEOC was denied permission to
intervene on one of two issues of its complaint. Permission was denied on appeal, and
the court of appeals awarded fees to Xerox, saying only that the appeal was "suffi-
ciently significant and discrete to be treated as a separate unit." Id. at 1133.
101 S. REP., supra note 9, at 5.
"I See, e.g., Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976). The parties
settled an employment discrimination suit and the court issued a consent decree. The
parties could not agree, however, on attorneys' fees. The plaintiff moved for a fee award
in her favor, and the court granted the motion. The court held that even though the
parties had settled out of court, the plaintiff was a "prevailing" party within the
meaning of Title VII, since she had been successful on the principal issue of discrimina-
tion. 411 F. Supp. at 1064. See also Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507
F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974); ASPIRA of New York, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 541
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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One element vital to encouraging private civil rights suits is as-
surance that fees awarded to prevailing plaintiffs will be adequate. 1r,
Generally, a court's discretionary determination of the amount of fee
awards is reviewable only for abuse of discretion."' 8 American courts
exercise this discretion by considering a variety of factors affecting
attorney compensation, 9 focusing principally on the time spent by
an attorney on a case, the reputation of the lawyer, the value of the
benefit sought, the difficulty of the questions involved, and the cus-
tomary fee for similar services in that locality."0 These factors are
difficult to quantify, and their primary value may lie only in re-
trospective justification of an award."' Nevertheless, trial judges
should attempt to award fees in a manner consistent with the policy
of the Act. In order to attract competent counsel to civil rights litiga-
tion, fees in those cases should approximate fees recovered in other
areas of the law."' Private vindication of civil rights will be promoted
by a judicial discretionary standard that does not penalize financially
an attorney who devotes his time to civil rights cases."3
" See, e.g., Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972), where the plaintiff succeeded in an employment
discrimination suit. Since the employer already had taken steps to correct the abuses,
the court of appeals declined to issue an injunction. Instead, the court remanded to
the district court to hold the case on its docket for a reasonable time in the event that
an injunction should become necessary. The court awarded attorneys' fees despite the
fact that no injunction had been issued. Id. at 1383.
In Kopet v. Esquire Realty Co., 523 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1975), two counts of a
complaint for securities law violations were dismissed for lack of pendent jurisdiction.
Nevertheless information obtained by discovery undertaken pursuant to those counts
formed the basis of subsequent action. The court awarded the plaintiff fees for the two
dismissed counts.
" See generally Nussbaum, Attorneys' Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48
N.Y.U.L. REV. 301 (1973); Sitkin & Kline, Financing Public Interest Litigation, 13
ARiz. L. REV. 823 (1971).
01 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
I" Theories of fee awards utilizing a fixed percentage of damages as the sole
determinant of the fee have been used by courts. See Note, Attorneys'Fees in Individ-
ual and Class Action Antitrust Litigation, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1656, 1662 (1972). This
method of determining fees clearly is inapplicable where the plaintiff seeks only injunc-
tive relief. Although straight hourly compensation is used by some courts to award fees,
most courts treat time expended as only one factor to be considered. Id. at 1665-66.
11 See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1974); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, D.R. 2-106; see generally 1 S.
SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES, 293-330 (1973).
" Note, Attorneys' Fees in Individual and Class Action Antitrust Litigation, 60
CALIF. L. REV. 1656 (1972).
"I H.R. RaP., supra note 22, at 9.
113 Id.
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A substantial number of these cases will proceed against state
officials. State officials acting in their official capacities are subject
to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of civil rights "under color
of any statute. . . of any State."11 4 Since the Act provides attorneys
fees in suits under § 1983, plaintiffs who prevail in such actions will
recover fees which ultimately must be paid from state funds. The
eleventh amendment,"15 however, and the principles of sovereign
immunity included within that amendment,"' bar imposition of
monetary liability in the form of damages upon state treasuries." 7
Nonetheless, Congress clearly possesses the authority to authorize
attorneys' fee awards in suits against state officials." 8 The enforce-
ment provisions of the fourteenth amendment empower Congress to
utilize measures reasonably adapted to protect fourteenth amend-
ment rights, even though such measures abrogate a State's sovereign
immunity."' Congress plainly intended the Civil Rights Attorneys'
' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which
sustained the constitutionality of § 1983 against a claim of state sovereign immunity.
The Court held that § 1983 was an effective enforcement of the fourteenth amendment.
,, U.S. CoNsT. Amend. XI provides:
The Judicial power of the 'United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.
' The Supreme Court has interpreted the eleventh amendment to extend to the
traditional limits of the common law sovereign immunity doctrine, which provides that
a State cannot be sued by anyone without its consent. See, e.g, Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1 (1890), where the Court interpreted the eleventh amendment to bar a suit
brought against a State by a citizen of the same State. In Ex parte New York, 256 U.S.
490 (1921), the Court prohibited suit against a State in admiralty, even though the
amendment mentions only law and equity. See cases collected at CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERvIcE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIcA: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1277 (1973).
"I Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). In Edelman, plaintiff brought suit to
enjoin Illinois' Director of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled from failing to comply
with federal time limits for processing applications for benefits, 45 C.F.R. §
206.10(a)(3)(1976). The complaint asked that the Director be ordered to return to the
members of plaintiff's class all benefits wrongfully withheld. 415 U.S. at 656. The
Court enjoined the wrongful conduct, but refused to award damages. A prospective
injunction obtained against state officials is clearly consistent with the holding of Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which authorized federal suits for injunctive relief
against state officials who exceeded their authority. An award of damages, however,
could impair the fiscal integrity of state governments, and therefore is barred by the
eleventh amendment. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
Thus, the effect of Edelman is to bar retroactive damage awards under § 1983, while
allowing suits for prospective injunctive relief.
" Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976).
"' Id. at 2671.
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Fees Awards Act to apply to state defendants. 0
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer2 the Supreme Court upheld an award of
attorneys' fees against a state official under Title VII. 22 The Court
ruled that the protection of the eleventh amendment is limited by
congressional authority to enforce the fourteenth amendment.,
Thus, Congress may choose to enforce the civil rights guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment by using the device of attorneys' fees to
encourage private litigation.' 21 Measures taken to enforce the four-
teenth amendment are not subject to the defense of sovereign im-
munity, since the states voluntarily surrendered their sovereign rights
when they ratified the amendment.'2 Therefore, the Court held that
the attorney's fee provisions of Title VII apply to state officials.'
2
1
Since the 1976 Attorneys' Fees Act is designed to effect enforcement
of fourteenth amendment rights,127 a statutory fee award under § 1983
' S. REP., supra note 9, at 5. The Senate Report stated:
in such cases it is intended that the attorneys' fees, like other items
of costs, will be collected either directly from the official, in his official
capacity, from funds of his agency or under his control, or from the
State or local government (whether or not the agency or government
is a named party).
Id.
121 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976). Plaintiff sued to enjoin the director of Connecticut's state
employees retirement plan from discriminating against men in awarding benefits. Id.
Title VII prohibits sexual discrimination in distribution of employee compensation. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1970). The statute provides for awards of attorneys' fees to prevail-
ing parties in language virtually identical to that of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(k)(1970).
"1 96 S. Ct. at 2671. See also Oliver v. Board of Educ., 45 U.S.L.W. 2262 (W.D.
Mich. Nov. 5, 1976). In Oliver the trial court held on the basis of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976), that the attorneys' fees provisions of the Emergency School Aid
Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. V 1975), apply to state officials acting within their
official capacities. 45 U.S.L.W. at 2262.
"1 Id. The Court quoted extensively from Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880),
in which the Court ruled that:
[tihe prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the
States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power. It is these
which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State
action, however put forth, whether that action be executive, legisla-
tive, or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty.
No law can be, which the people of the States have, by the Constitu-
tion of the United States, empowered Congress to enact.
Id. at 346, quoted at 96 S. Ct. 2670.
121 96 S. Ct. at 2671.
12S Id.
126 96 S. Ct. at 2671-72.
I" S. REP., supra note 9, at 5.
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should not be barred by the eleventh amendment.'2
The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, coupled with
a comprehensive body of case law dealing with similar statutes, pro-
vides a strong incentive for private enforcement of civil rights. The
Act represents another in a long series of equitable and statutory
deviations from the traditional American rule that each litigant must
bear the burden of attorneys' fees. That burden falls hard upon the
victims of civil rights violations. The very discrimination of which the
plaintiff complains often deprives him of the earning power necessary
to finance costly litigation challenging that discrimination.' 29 Thus,
Congress has shifted attorneys' fees to those responsible for that dis-
crimination. While the outcome clashes with the American rule of
attorneys' fees, it is consistent with American notions of equality
before the law.
ScoTT HAMILTON
' After Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), a split developed among the
circuits regarding whether fee awards based only upon the courts' equitable powers and
not authorized by statute could be made under § 1983 in the face of the eleventh
amendment. Compare Bond v. Stanton, 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.), vacated, 45 U.S.L.W.
3394 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1976), and Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975), and
Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir.), vacated 423 U.S. 809 (1975), and Jordan
v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1974); with Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.
1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 982 (1975), and Jordan v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975), and Named Individual Members of San
Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975). See generally Note, Attorneys'Fees and the Eleventh
Amendment, 88 HAnv. L. REv. 1875 (1975).
The Seventh Circuit, in Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College,
No. 76-1613 (7th Cir. June 21, 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S.
Nov. 30, 1976), held that the eleventh amendment bars recovery of fees from a State
when the award is based on pre-litigation obstinacy. Nevertheless, the court approved
fee awards based on bad faith conduct occurring after initiation of the lawsuit. No.
76-1613 at 9.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of equitable fee awards
against state officials in Bond v. Stanton, 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S.
Ct. 2224 (1976), but later vacated the circuit court decision and remanded for consider-
ation in light of the new Attorneys' Fees Act. 45 U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1976).
On remand, the question of retroactive application of the Act becomes an issue. The
Act seems clearly applicable to Bond. In Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974),
the Supreme Court faced a similar situation with regard to an award of fees under 20
U.S.C. § 1617. That provision of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 had been
passed after Bradley was decided at the district court level. The Supreme Court held
that the fee provision was retroactice, and remanded for an award of fees incurred
before enactment of the statute. The Court declared that "a court is to apply the law
in effect as of the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest
injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary." Id. at
711.
i' Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights Litigation, supra note 29.
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